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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises after the District Court denied a joint motion for 
attorney's fees and expenses brought by Co-Appellants Hobson Fabricating 
Corporation ("Hobson") and SE/Z Construction, LLC ("SE/Z") (collectively, the 
"Contractors") under I.C. §12-117. Hobson seeks: a) a reversal of that denial; b) 
remand to the District Court for a proper award of I. C. § 12-117 attorney's fees 
and expenses; and c) an award of their attorney's fees and expenses on appeal, 
also under I.C. §12-117. 
The District Court erred in denying attorney's fees and expenses to the 
Contractors, because in doing so it ignored both its own findings and the plain 
language of I.C. §12-117. The effect of the District Court's denial was to 
impermissibly read I.C. §12-117 out of existence, and to deny the Contractors the 
award of attorney's fees and expenses that is mandatory under that statute. 
The District Court determined that the Contractors had "prevailed in part" 
below, particularly when the District Court ruled that the State of Idaho 
Department of Public Works' ("DPW") multi-million dollar "counter-cross-c1aim" 
(the "cross claim") was "barred" because DPW failed to adhere to the contractual 
prerequisites that would have allowed it. The District Court's rulings demonstrate 
that DPW's cross-claim was brought without any legal bases, and was without 
efficacy ab initio. 
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Over a period of more than four years, the District Court denied several 
motions by the Contractors to dismiss the cross-claim. In order to avoid the 
cross-claim's dismissal, DPW repeatedly misinterpreted to the District Court the 
"clear and unambiguous" construction contract it had with SEll, despite DPW 
having drafted it. Though the District Court knew that DPW's impermissible 
cross-claim had visited many hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees 
and expenses on the Contractors, and despite determining it to have been 
wrongfully brought, the District Court denied the Contractors any recovery under 
/. C. § 12-117, failing even to mention that statute in the Memorandum Decision 
and Order denying the Contractors' joint motion. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On October 25, 2005, nearly five months after SEll and the project 
Architect Rudeen & Associates ("Rudeen") were terminated for convenience by 
DPW, Hobson initiated this action against SEll, in order to assert pass through 
claims against DPW as well as a direct action against DPW. R. Vol. I, p. 35. 
SEll filed its Answer and Cross-Claim against DPW on November 21,2005. R. 
Vol. I, pp. 63, 71. On December 9, 2005 DPW filed Answers, as well as a 
Counter-Cross-Claim (the "cross claim") against SEll and a Counterclaim 
against Hobson. R. Vol. I, pp. 88 - 105. DPW also filed a Third-Party Complaint 
against Rudeen. R. Vol. I, p. 115. Finally, Hobson filed a separate action 
against a number of DPW employees, individually, asserting a number of torts 
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against them. R. Vol. I, p. 193. Hobson's separate action against the individual 
defendants was consolidated with this matter on DPW's motion. R. Vol. II, p. 
200. 
Throughout the course of the litigation, SE/Z and Hobson filed and argued 
several motions seeking to enforce the parties' contract and to eliminate DPW's 
cross claim, contending it was not allowed under DPW's contract with SE/Z (the 
"Main Contract"). SE/Z filed: a) a motion for summary judgment regarding the 
preclusive effect of DPW's election to terminate the Main Contract for 
convenience (R. Vol. II, p. 212); b) a motion for summary judgment regarding 
DPW's failure to provide notice of its "claims" (R. Vol. II, p. 238); and c) a motion 
to reconsider the District Court's denial of the notice motion. Having had its 
motions denied by the District Court, SE/Z filed a motion to appeal by permission, 
which was also denied. 
Finally, just before the October 2008 trial, SE/Z brought a Motion in Limine 
regarding DPW's failure to have provided SE/Z with notice and an opportunity to 
cure potential and alleged construction defects. R. Vol. II, pp. 288A-TI. When 
the District Court denied that motion, SE/Z brought a motion to reconsider, which 
was also denied. R. Vol. II, p. 288UU. In response to each of SE/Z's and 
Hobson's motions regarding its failure to have complied with the notice and 
opportunity to cure provisions of the Main Contract, DPW essentially asserted 
there were issues of fact for trial. 
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A jury trial was commenced October 15, 2008, and continued for 11 trial 
days. Ultimately, the District Court declared a mistrial due to the length of time 
likely required to complete the trial. R. Vol. III, p. 437-438. The District Court's 
decision to declare a mistrial occurred shortly after the cross examination of 
SE/Z's managing member, Steve Zambarano, during which DPW's counsel 
essentially identified for the District Court and jury that DPW's "notice" under the 
various provisions of the Contract were met by way of its cross claim against 
SE/Z. Tr. October 29, 2008, pp. 290-302. It became apparent at trial that DPW's 
alleged compliance with the notice provisions of the parties' Contract was only by 
way of its cross claim. Id. 
In March 2010, as the date to commence the second trial approached, 
Hobson, on behalf of the Contractors filed a Motion in Limine seeking to enforce 
the notice and opportunity to cure provisions of the Contract. R. Vol. IV, p. 620. 
Ultimately, when the District Court re-examined the notice issue, it agreed with 
the Contractors' position that DPW's cross claim was barred by its failure to have 
complied with the "notice and opportunity to cure" provisions of the Main 
Contract. 1 R. Vol. IV, pp. 625-27. In early April 2010, the District Court denied 
DPW's motion to reconsider its ruling on Hobson's Motion in Limine. R. Vol. IV, 
pp. 730-44. Thereafter, Hobson and SE/Z settled their claims, and SE/Z settled 
1 The court had previously dismissed on summary judgment Hobson's direct claims against DPW 
and DPW's counterclaims against Hobson. (R. Vol. _, pp. 239-48; R. Vol. _, p. _ 
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with DPW, reserving only the issue of prevailing party attorney's fees. R. Vol. IV, 
pp. 746-49. The court denied attorney's fees to the Contractors, determining that 
neither they nor DPW were the overall prevailing party. R. VoL, pp. 1554-1561. 
III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 2004, the State contracted with Co-Appellant SE/Z for the construction 
of a Bio-Safety Level 3 laboratory in Boise, Ada County, Idaho (the "Project"). R. 
Vol. III, pp. 330-415. The State drafted the Project contract it had with SE/Z (the 
"Main Contract"). Id. 
In turn, SE/Z awarded a subcontract for the mechanical construction 
portion of the Project work to Hobson. R. Vol. III, pp. 418-27. The Project 
subcontract with SE/Z obligated Hobson to the same terms and conditions to 
which SE/Z was obligated in its contract with the State. R., Vol III, pp. 418-19 
(Article I). 
By early 2005, the Project was beset with problems, which impeded its 
completion. R. Vol. II, p. 252. Among the most critical of the problems was the 
inability to achieve a final air balance of the critical Project HVAC system, 
installed by Hobson. R., Vol. I, pp. 97-103. The Contractors and the State blamed 
each other for the problems that were preventing the project from being 
completed. See, inter alia, R. Vol. I, pp. 71-77; 79-87; and 97-103. 
On June 3, 2005, with the project still incomplete, DPW terminated the 
Main Contract, specifying that its termination of SE/Z was "for convenience," not 
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"for default." R. Vol. /I, p. 240. In turn, SE/Z terminated its subcontract with 
Hobson, also for convenience. R. Vol. V, p. 881. 
Thereafter, in accordance with the Main Contract, the Contractors 
prepared and submitted to DPW their termination for convenience costs in the 
form of Requests for Equitable Adjustment. R. Vol. I, p. 74. Rather than abiding 
by the Main Contract's provisions regarding a termination for convenience, DPW 
refused to make further payment to SE/Z, including for undisputed amounts owed 
or for the release of retainage. Id. 
On September 21, 2005, SE/Z and Hobson entered into a Claims 
Prosecution Agreement, by which they agreed to jointly pursue their respective 
claims on the Project, and to defend claims brought against them by DPW. R. 
Vol. V, pp. 881-84. 
The underlying action was filed by Hobson on October 25, 2005. R. Vol 1, 
P. 35-41. In its original complaint, Hobson brought a cause of action against 
SE/Z for breach of contract, noting: 
Plaintiff Hobson and Defendant SE/Z have, consistent with the 
provisions of the Subcontract Agreement, entered into a Pass-
Through Agreement ("Agreement") as contemplated by the Severin 
Doctrine, whereby Defendant SE/Z will remain fully liable for all of 
Plaintiff Hobson's loss, cost and expenses incurred, as alleged 
heretofore, subject to compensation as and to the extent received 
from Defendant State in connection herewith. 
R., vol. I, p. 39. 
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On December 9, 2005, despite having terminated SEll for convenience, 
and without having provided SEll or Hobson with any of the claim notices or 
opportunities to cure required of it under the Main Contract, DPW filed a Counter 
Cross-Claim (the "cross-claim") against SEll, asserting damages of 
approximately $3 million for alleged deficiencies in the Project work, many of 
which DPW alleged were the responsibility of Hobson. R. Vol. I, pp. 105-113.2 
DPW engaged Washington Group International as its repair contractor and 
expert, and relied heavily on its assertions of the Contractors' wrongdoing to 
support the cross-claim. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1509-10 
In addition to the alleged costs required to "repair" the allegedly "deficient 
work" of the Contractors, DPW's cross-claim also asserted a right to recover from 
the Contractor both "liquidated damages" and "reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs pursuant to the Main Contract and applicable statutes, including but not 
limited to Idaho Code §§12-117, 12-120 and 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54 ... " R. Vol. I, 
p. 112 (emphasis added). 
From the time DPW first alleged its cross-claim, the Contractors 
consistently maintained that it was wrongful. Hobson, in response to the cross-
claim filed against it asserted defenses including: a) DPW had failed to state a 
claim on which relief could be granted; b) DPW's claims were barred as a result 
2 DPW also asserted a direct cross-claim against Hobson, asserting that it was a third-party 
beneficiary of the SE/Z-Hobson subcontract. P.97-103. DPW's cross-claim against Hobson was 
dismissed on summary judgment. P.238-48. 
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of the termination for convenience; c) estoppel; d) waiver; and e) DPW's failure to 
have met the contractual prerequisites to allow its cross-claim. R. Vol. I, pp. 174-
180. Similarly, SE/Z asserted that DPW's cross-claim was wrongful due to, inter 
alia: a) estoppel due to DPW's termination of SE/Z for convenience; b) failure to 
provide notice under the parties' contract; and c) waiver based on DPW's 
termination of SE/Z for convenience. R. Vol. I, pp. 182-190. 
In early 2006, Hobson initiated a separate action against individual 
employees of DPW, alleging a number of torts against them. R. Vol. I. pp. 193-
99. DPW successfully moved to consolidate that separate action into the instant 
one. R. Vol. II, pp. 200-01. DPW then successfully sought summary judgment 
against Hobson on its claims against the individual defendants. R. Vol. II, pp. 
263-72. 
On February 28, 2007, the District Court denied SE/Z's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the issue of whether or not DPW's cross-claim was 
barred by its failure to have complied with the Main Contract's notice 
requirements. R. Vol. II, pp. 238-248. 
On September 12, 2008, SE/Z filed an unsuccessful motion in limine that 
sought to preclude DPW from providing any evidence to the jury of damages 
alleged to have resulted from any alleged deficiencies in the Contractors' Project 
work unless DPW could demonstrate: a) its compliance with the prerequiSite 
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provisions of two portions of the Main Contract; or b) that it provided actual notice 
of its claims for damages to SE/Z. R. Vol. II, pp. 288A-288EE. 
In opposing the Contractors' motions seeking dismissal of the cross-claim, 
DPW repeatedly asserted to the District Court that the Main Contract allowed its 
pursuit of post-termination relief against the Contractors: 
The claims that arose in this case for the state were those that 
arose after the lawsuit was filed, and we submitted them by way of 
our counter-cross claim, if you will. And so, it's going to be our 
position that we did not, we did not by filing the lawsuit under those 
circumstances have to comply with the terminated contract's 
condition precedent. 
Tr., October 15, 2008177:6-13. See also, R. Vol. I, pp. 97-103; 104-13; Vol. IV, 
p.625, 
Denied dismissal of DPW's counter-claim, the Contractors were forced to 
engage in an expensive defense of it. See, R. Vol. IV, pp. 757-866; Vol. V, pp. 
867-925; 926-61; and 962-1003. Refutation of DPW's alleged damages and the 
experts that supported them required the Contractors to participate in dozens of 
depositions taken over weeks, engage technical and financial experts, and 
continue to bring and defend pre-trial motions involving the cross-claim. Id. 
Ultimately, even prior to the matter's first trial, the Contractors expended 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in defending against the cross-claim. Id. 
After 11 days of trial in October 2008, the Court declared a mistrial, and 
scheduled a re-trial in April 2010. R. Vol. II, pp. 289-292. After the mistrial, the 
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Court allowed Hobson's counsel to withdraw. R Vol. IV, p. 621. Substitute 
counsel appeared for Hobson, and prepared for the second trial. Id. 
On March 24, 2010, the District Court heard motions in limine brought by 
Hobson on behalf of the Contractors. R Vol. IV, p. 621. Among those motions 
was Hobson's motion seeking to limit DPW from presenting evidence to the jury 
of any alleged deficiencies in the Contractors' work, without DPW first proving 
that it had complied with portions of the Main Contract-not previously the 
subject of SE/Z's motion practice-requiring DPW to provide notice and 
opportunity to cure. See generally, R Vol. IV, pp. 619-28. 
On March 26, 2010, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order 
providing, in pertinent parts: 
Under the terms of the contract, the State was required to give the 
contractors a written notice of allegedly defective work and 
opportunity to cure the alleged defect. (See, Construction Contract, 
Article 2.4.1) ... The State has previously urged the Court that the 
law should allow the State the opportunity to show, in order to be 
relieved of the contractual obligation to provide notice and 
opportunity to cure, that the contractors had actual knowledge of 
the alleged defects and that the contractors suffered no prejudice 
by the State's failure to provide notice and opportunity to cure ... 
R, Vol. IV, P 625. 
The Court finds it would be impossible to reconcile any possible 
finding of lack of prejudice to the contractors with the prosecution of 
the cross-claim by the State to recover damages ... 
R. Vol. IV, 626 (emphasis added). 
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On April 2, 2010, the District Court denied DPW's Motion to Reconsider 
the March 26, 2010 Order. R. Vol. IV, pp. 730-742. In so doing, the District 
Court held, in pertinent part: 
.. , the State will not be permitted to present any evidence that work 
that is not directly related to the Contractor's claim for termination 
for convenience damages was not done according to the plans and 
specifications. This is consistent with the Court's recent ruling that 
the State's cross-claims and offsets are barred by the failure to 
provide notice and opportunity to cure. 
R. Vol. IV, p. 741 (emphasis added). 
After making its ruling, the Court determined that all that was left for the 
second trial was the remaining claims of the Contractors: 
.. the Court now considers that the only remaining issue for trial is 
how much money, if any, the contractors are owed under the 
termination for convenience clause. 
R. Vol. IV, pp. 626-27. 
On April 29, 2010, SEll and Hobson settled their causes of action, 
reserving only the issue of the determination by the Court of a prevailing party 
and an award of attorney's fees, which SEll and Hobson agreed to pursue jointly 
pursuant to their Claims Prosecution Agreement and Joint Defense Agreement. 
R. Vol. V, p. 932; see also, R. Vol. VIII, p. 1559. On that same day, SEll and the 
State reached a verbal agreement settling the remaining substantive causes of 
action between them, under which the State would pay SEll $225,000 (from 
which SEll agreed to settle its pass-through claims with Hobson), with DPW and 
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SE/Z reserving for the District Court the issues of prevailing party status and 
award of costs and attorney's fees. Id. 
On May 5, 2010, the parties filed a stipulation with the District Court, 
informing the court that: a) the substantive causes remaining in the litigation had 
been settled for a payment by the State of $225,000 to SE/Z; and b) the parties 
had reserved for determination by the Court the issues of the taxation of costs or 
fees. R. Vol. IV, pp. 746-49. 
After briefing of the issues of prevailing party(ies), costs and attorney's 
fees (the Contractors filed a joint motion, R. Vol. V. pp. 926-960), on August 9, 
2010 the District Court heard argument on those issues. See generally, 
Verbatim Report of Proceedings, August 9, 2010. The Contractors asserted that 
the District Court's rulings on DPW's cross-claim should determine them to have 
been the prevailing parties under I.C. §12-117. See generally, R. Vol. V., pp. 
926-60. 
On September 14, 2010, the District Court issued a Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Prevailing Party, Costs and Attorney Fees. R. Vol. VIII, 
pp. 1554-60. That Order found that the individual defendants were "prevailing 
parties," and awarded them costs as a matter of right, payable by Hobson. R. 
Vol. VIII, p. 1558. The Court then determined that DPW and the Contractors 
were each "prevailing in part" on the balance of the claims, and that therefore, 
none was entitled to an award of attorney's fees or expenses. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 
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1558-60. In making its Order, the District Court specifically found that the 
Contractors had "prevailed in part" by defeating DPW's cross-claim: 
Because the State sought to limit the Contractors' claims and was 
ultimately successful, and because the Contractors sought to 
narrow the State's counterclaims and offsets and was [sic] 
ultimately, successful, the Court now holds that each partv 
prevailed in part. 
R. Vol. VIII, p. 1559 (emphasis added). 
The District Court's September 15, 2010 Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Prevailing Party, Costs and Attorney Fees includes no analysis of I.C. 
§12-117, not mentioning that statute even one time in the decision. R. Vol. VIII, 
pp.1554-60. 
The Contractors timely filed their Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2010. 
R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1570-75. 
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
In accordance with I.A.R. 40 and 41, Hobson asserts a right to costs 
attorney's fees on this appeal. As more fully explained in the Authority section 
below, Hobson asserts that its right to attorney's fees on appeal, as below, arises 
under I.C. §12-117, due to the wrongful nature of DPW's cross-claim. 
V. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. Under: a) its previous rulings on DPW's cross-claim; and b) I.R.C.P. 
54, the District Court abused its discretion by not finding that the Contractors 
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prevailed in the action below (at least in part), for the purposes of a mandatory 
award of attorney's fees and expenses under I.C. §12-117. 
2. The District Court erred by failing to determine that the Contractors 
were entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees under I.C. §12-117, when: 
a) it ruled that DPW's cross-claim was "barred," based on Hobson's motion in 
limine; b) it ruled that DPW's cross-claim was barred because DPW did not 
adhere to the contractual prerequisites that would have allowed it, meaning the 
cross-claim was brought without reasonable basis in fact or law, and was 
wrongful ab initio; and c) DPW's cross-claim caused the Contractors to incur 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees and expenses. 
3. The District Court erred by awarding fees to the individual 
defendants, who were not properly determined to have been prevailing below, 
because they were consolidated into the case and defended by DPW, which was 
not a prevailing party. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by not determining the 
Contractors to have been overall prevailing parties for the purposes of an award 
of attorney's fees and expenses, when the Contractors: a) received the only 
positive financial recovery in the action; b) prevailed on ten of 15 causes of action 
contested below; and c) defeated DPW's cross-claim, by far the largest claim in 
the action below? (Assignment of Error No.1) 
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2. Did the District Court err by not determining the Contractors to have 
been the prevailing parties for award of attorney's fees and expenses under I.C. 
§12-117 on DPW's cross-claim, when: a) the District Court found that DPW's 
cross-claim was "barred," due to its failure to have adhered to the contractual 
prerequisites that would have allowed it; b) the District Court's rulings 
demonstrate that the DPW cross-claim was brought without reasonable basis in 
law or fact; c) DPW misinterpreted its "clear and unambiguous" contract with 
SE/Z to the District Court on multiple occasions in order to preserve its wrongful 
cross-claim; and d) DPW's cross-claim required the Contractors to incur 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees and expenses? (Assignment 
of Error No.1) 
3. Did the District Court err by failing to address the mandatory nature 
of I.C. §12-117(2) when it denied the Contractors' Joint Motion for September 15, 
2010 Memorandum Decision and Order on Prevailing Party, Costs and Attorney 
Fees, when: a) it ruled that DPW's cross-claim was "barred," and therefore was 
without legal basis to ab initio; and b) it ruled that the Contractors had "prevailed 
in part" by having defeated DPW's cross-claim? (Assignments of Error Nos. 1 
and 2) 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by determining the individual 
defendants to be a prevailing party and awarding them costs from Hobson, since: 
a) Hobson's case against the individual defendants was consolidated into the 
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action by DPW's motion; b) DPW defended the individual defendants at no cost 
to them personally; and c) neither the individual defendants nor DPW was 
determined by the trial court to have been an overall prevailing party in the 
action, and therefore entitled to any award of costs or fees? 
VII. AUTHORITY 
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
In reviewing a trial court's determination of award of attorney's fees and 
expenses under I.C. §12-117, Idaho appellate courts exercise "free review." 
See, e.g. Rincover v. State Dept. of Finance, Securities Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 
549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352, 
109 P.3d 1091, 1094 (2005). This Court has determined that regardless of the 
circumstances under which a lower court made a determination as to the 
appropriateness of an award under I.C. §12-117, the "ultimate obligation" for 
determining on appeal "whether an award under I.C. §12-117 would properly lie" 
is the appellate courts'. Id. For purposes of this appeal, then, this Court is not 
bound by the findings of the District Court in its September 15, 2010 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Prevailing Party, Costs and Attorney Fees, 
and can and should consider de novo, the established facts and findings of the 
District Court, together with the applicability of I.C. § 12-117 in determining 
whether the District Court erred in not making award to the Contractors. 
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Idaho appellate courts review a trial court's decision determining the 
prevailing party for purposes of an award of costs and attorney's fees on an 
abuse of discretion basis. "A court's determination of prevailing party status for 
attorney fees under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion." Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 245 P.3d 
992, 1008 (2010), citing, Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903,915,204 P.3d 1114, 
1126 (2009). 
When examining whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court 
considers whether the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently within the 
applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
See, Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125 (2010), citing, 
Shore v. Peterson, supra, at 915. 
The District Court's failure to have applied its own previous findings, and 
then to have considered and properly applied the plain and mandatory language 
of I.C. § 12-117 was error, reversible by this Court on free review. Especially 
telling in this matter was the District Court's failure, in light of its finding that the 
Contractors "prevailed in part" by defeating DPW's cross-claim, to perform any 
analysis of the applicability of I.C. §12-117(2), the plain language of which 
militates for an award to the Contractors for defeating DPW's wrongful cross-
claim. 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS REQUIRED IT TO AWARD THE 
CONTRACTORS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES UNDER I.C. 
§12-117. 
The District Court's findings that DPW's cross-claim was "barred," and that 
the Contractors "prevailed in part" by defeating that cross claim required the 
District Court to make an award to the Contractors of attorney's fees and 
expenses under I.C. §12-117. Its failure to have done so ignored both its 
repeated findings regarding the lack of legal efficacy of DPW's cross-claim, and 
the plain language of I.C. §12-117. 
The District Court's decision on the Contractors' joint motion for attorney's 
fees and expenses impermissibly read I.C. §12-117 out of existence. As a 
matter of both law and policy, the District Court's failure to make an I.C. §12-117 
award to the Contractors their attorney's fees and expenses allowed DPW to 
wrongfully visit hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees and expenses 
on the Contractors. This Court has held several times that such a result 
contravenes the purposes for which I.C. §12-117 was enacted. 
I. C. § 12-117 provides, in pertinent parts: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative 
proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties 
a state agency or political subdivision and a person, the state 
agency or political subdivision or the court, as the case may be, 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness 
fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
(2) If a party to an administrative proceeding or to a civil judicial 
proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and the state agency 
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or political subdivision or the court, as the case may be, finds that 
the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law with respect to that portion of the case, it shall award the 
partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees 
and other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the 
case on which it prevailed .. , 
(4) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) "Person" shall mean any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association or any other private organization; 
(b) "Political subdivision" shall mean a city, a county or any 
taxing district. 
(c) "State agency" shall mean any agency as defined in 
section 67-5201 Idaho Code. 
I.C. §12-117 (emphasis added). 
I.C. §67-5201 (2) defines "agency," as: 
"Agency" means each state board, commission, department or 
officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested 
cases, but does not include the legislative or judicial branches, 
executive officers listed in section 1, article IV, of the constitution of 
the state of Idaho in the exercise of powers derived directly and 
exclusively from the constitution, the state militia or the state board 
of correction. 
I.C. §67-5201(2). DPW is a "state agency" under this definition, and therefore 
also for purposes of the enforcement of I.C. §12-117. 
In order to award attorney fees under I.C. §12-117, a court must not only 
find that the agency acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, it must also 
find in favor of the party requesting fees. See, e.g., Neighbors for a Healthy Gold 
Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 138, 176 P.3d 126,143 (2007), citing 
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CanallNorcrestiColumbus Action Committee v. City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 
671, 39 P.3d 606, 611 (2001). Both criteria for the award of I.C. §12-117 
attorney's fees and expenses are present here, and the failure of the District 
Court to have made the mandatory award was error. 
The District Court ignored its own findings regarding the efficacy of DPW's 
cross-claim, and its finding that the Contractors prevailed "in part." It further 
failed to even consider I.C. §12-117 in its decision, instead limiting its 
consideration to an I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) analysis. This ignored the well-settled 
requirement that I.C. §12-117 attorney's fees and expenses must be awarded to 
a party even partially prevailing in an action-like this one-in which a state 
agency acted "without reasonable basis in fact or law." 
Idaho authority requires that the I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) criteria must be 
applied by a court determining which party is "prevailing," when a statute 
providing for an award of attorney's fees is at issue. See, e.g., Shurtliff v. 
Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263,269,815 P.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1991). 
This Court has held that the purpose of I.C. §12-117 is: 
(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; 
and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and 
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges 
or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should harvel 
made. 
Bogner v. State Oep't of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 
1056, 1061 (1984) (citations omitted); see also, Rincover v. State Oep't of 
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Finance, Securities Bureau, supra, 132 Idaho at 549, 976 P.2d at 475. Here, the 
District Court's decision failed to meet that purpose. 
When statutes are unambiguous, Idaho courts give effect to the 
legislature's clearly expressed intent. See, e.g., Rogers v. Household Life Ins. 
Co., 150 Idaho 735, 250 P.3d 786, 790 (2011), citing Kootenai Hosp. Dist. v. 
Bonner County Bd. of Commissioners, 149 Idaho 290,293,233 P.3d 1212, 1215 
(2010) (other citations omitted). This Court has established that Idaho "[s]tatutes 
must be read to give effect to every word, clause and sentence." See, e.g., 
Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 476, 725 P.2d 179, 181 (1986), citing, Univ. of 
Utah Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 245, 611 P.2d 1030 (1980). 
When its decision on the Contractors' joint motion did not even mention I. C. § 12-
117, the District Court impermissibly failed to give effect to any of the "words, 
clauses and sentences" in that statute. 
The language of I.C. 12-117(2) is "mandatory" because it includes the 
word "shall." See, e.g., Mendenhall, supra at 146 Idaho at 438, 196 P.3d at 356 
(2008), citing Paolini v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 Idaho 549-50, 149 P.3d 822, 824-
25 (2006) ("shall when, used in a statute imposes a mandatory obligation"). 
Referring to I.C. §12-117, this Court has held: 
The statute is not discretionary but provides that the court must 
award attorney fees where a state agency did not act with a 
reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving a person 
who prevails in the action. 
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Fischer v. City of Ketchum, supra, 141 Idaho at 355-56, citing, Oep't of Finance 
v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282, 284, 1 P.3d 783, 785 (2000) 
(emphasis added). 
In Bogner, supra, this Court held: 
... one of the purposes of this section [I.C. §12-117] is to provide a 
remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial 
burden attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have 
made. 
107 Idaho at 859 (emphasis added). These Contractors are precisely the kinds 
of "persons" the statute was enacted to protect from unwarranted burden by the 
State. The denial of the Contractors' joint motion for costs and attorney's fees 
aI/owed DPW to bring a meritless and legally indefensible cross-claim, and to 
"unfairly" and "unjustifiably" visit hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney's 
fees and expenses on the Contractors. The District Court's decision denied the 
Contractors the protection to which they are entitled under I.C. §12-117. 
This Court has held I.C. §12-117 to be unambiguous, and has commented 
on that statute's "clearly expressed intent." 
In clear, unambiguous and mandatory language, I.C. §12-117 
requires an award of reasonable attorney fees merely upon a 
showing "that the agency acted without reasonable basis in fact or 
law." 
Lockhart v. Oep't of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894, 898, 828 P.2d 1299, 1303 
(1992), (emphasis added). The term "reasonable" is defined as "being or 
remaining within the bounds of reason ... not extreme ... not excessive ... not 
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demanding too much." Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 437, 196 P.3d 
352, 355 (2008), citing, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1892 
(1966). The District Court's findings demonstrate there was nothing "reasonable" 
about DPW's cross-claim, including nothing that properly prevented it from 
enforcing I.C. §12-117. 
1. The District Court's Findings Demonstrate that DPW's Cross-
Claim Was Brought Without Reasonable Basis in Law or Fact. 
The District Court made repeated rulings that demonstrate DPW's cross-
claim was brought without "reasonable basis in fact or law," and therefore, was a 
claim that DPW should never have made. Those findings clearly implicate I.C. 
§12-117, and on this Court's free review, militate for a reversal of the trial Court's 
denial of attorney's and expenses to the Contractors. 
The District Court was persuaded by DPW to allow the cross-claim to 
survive several attempts by the Contractors to have it dismissed (see below). 
Ultimately, however, after more than four years of litigating it, the District Court 
determined the cross-claim to have been "barred" by DPW's failure to have 
provided the Contractors with the required "notice and opportunity to cure" the 
Main Contract said it must. The District Court, ruled, inter alia: 
In its February 28, 2007 Order, the Court held that the State could 
avoid strict compliance of the notice and opportunity to cure 
provision if it were able to establish actual notice and lack of 
prejudice ... The Court finds it would be impossible to reconcile any 
possible finding of a lack of prejudice to the contractors with the 
prosecution of the cross-claim by the State ... because the State 
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admittedly failed to discover the alleged defects until after it had 
terminated the contract for convenience. 
R. Vol. IV, pp. 625-26 (emphasis added). 
" ... the State may not.. .recover for the cost of repairing or replacing 
allegedly defective work which was admittedly discovered post-
termination for which it gave no notice or opportunity to cure. 
R. Vol. IV, p. 628 (emphasis added). 
" ... the State's cross-claims and offsets are barred by the notice and 
opportunity to cure provision ... " 
R. Vol. IV, p. 738 (emphasis added). 
" ... the State's cross claims are barred by the failure to provide 
notice and opportunity to cure." 
R. Vol. IV, p. 744 (emphasis added). 
"To bar," in the legal context means, "the nullifying, defeating or preventing 
of a claim or action." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 106 (1981).3 Here, DPW's cross-claim was "barred" because it was 
without efficacy ab initio due to the failure to have adhered to the contractual 
prerequisites that could have allowed it. 
DPW admitted that it failed to provide the Contractors with the requisite 
"notice and opportunity to cure," but continued to erroneously insist to the District 
3 This Court has adopted definitions from the American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language for more than 20 years. See, e.g., Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 499, 700 P.2d 
115,121 (1985); Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185,197,814 P.2d 917, 
929 (1991); and Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofldaho, 147 Idaho 67,71,205 P.3d 1203,1207 
(2009). The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language can now be accessed 
through http://www.dictionary.com. and includes "a stoppage or defeat of an alleged right of 
action" as a definition of "bar." 
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Court that the Main Contract provided DPW the right to pursue the Contractors. 
In open court, DPW's counsel confirmed DPW's failure to follow the Main 
Contract, saying: "Now, did we give them an opportunity to cure? No." Tr. 
September 29,2008,20:8-9. 
In order to avoid dismissal of the cross-claim, DPW repeatedly and 
erroneously misinterpreted the contract to the District Court, asserting contrary to 
the Main Contract's "clear and unambiguous" language that cross-claim was 
allowed by the Main Contract. The cross-claim incorrectly asserts, "[t]he State 
has fully performed all of its obligations under the Contract Documents." R. Vol. 
I, p. 108. 
When it realized it had failed to meet its "notice and opportunity to cure" 
Main Contract obligation, DPW falsely asserted to the District Court that it was 
somehow not subject to those contract provisions. See, e.g., R. Vol. II, p. 244 
(UDPW argues that the notice provision in the contract was not a condition 
precedent..."); see a/so, Tr., October 15, 2008177:10-13. (" ... it's going to be our 
position that we did not. .. have to comply with the terminated contract's condition 
precedent."). Notably, in oral argument before the District Court in opposition to 
SE/Z's motions in limine, counsel for DPW asserted, erroneously: 
We are not precluded by any language in this contract from 
asserting claims under this contract. We are not precluded by any 
language in this contract from properly asserting warranty claims, 
or express warranty claims, or straight breach claims, when we 
discover them. 
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Tr., October 15,2008, 109:14-20. 
Idaho authority provides that its courts are required to construe a contract 
against the party that drafted it. "We construe the contract against the person 
who prepared the contract." Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754 
(2007), citing, Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 751, 53 
P.3d 330 (2002). Here, DPW drafted the Main Contract, and therefore it must be 
construed against DPW. 
The District Court repeatedly held that the Main Contract was "clear and 
unambiguous." See, e.g., R. Vol. " pp. 216 and 278-79; Vol. IV, pp. 628 and 
740. In Idaho, a contract term is deemed ambiguous when there are two 
different reasonable interpretations, or the language is nonsensical. See, e.g., 
Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). 
Here, because the contract was "clear and unambiguous," the provisions 
included in it regarding "notice an opportunity to cure" were likewise 
unambiguous, and therefore should have informed DPW that there were no 
bases for its cross-claim. 
In Ralph Naylor Farms v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 172 P.3d 1081 
(2007), this Court engaged in a significant analysis of the "reasonable basis" 
language included in Fischer and other decisions. See, e.g., 141 Idaho at 355-
56. Centrally important to a determination of whether the District Court erred in 
not awarding the Contractors I.C. §12-117 attorney's fees and expenses is the 
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Ralph Naylor Farms holding that "[w]here an agency acts without authority, it is 
acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Id., citing Fischer, 141 Idaho at 
356, 109 P.3d at 1098; Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand & Gravel, 140 Idaho 115, 
120,90 P.3d 340, 345 (2004). 
The findings of the District Court show that based on DPW's failure to 
have adhered to contractual prerequisites, there were no legal bases on which 
DPW was permitted to bring its cross-claim. DPW brought its cross-claim 
"without authority," something confirmed by the District Court's determination that 
the cross-claim was "barred." 
DPW's failures to comply with the Main Contract it drafted, and its multiple 
misinterpretations of the Main Contract to the District Court prove on this Court's 
free review that DPW's cross-claim was brought without the necessary legal or 
factual efficacy, and therefore without a "reasonable basis". The District Court 
therefore erred by not properly considering DPW's actions in light of the 
mandatory language of I.C. §12-117, and further erred by not making an award 
of attorney's fees and expenses to the Contractors under that statute. 
2. The District Court's Denial of Attorney's Fees and Expenses to 
the Contractors Impermissibly Reads I.C. §12-117 Out of 
Existence. 
The District Court's written Memorandum Decision on the Contractors' 
joint motion inexplicably included no reference to I.C. §12-117. In contravention 
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to the policy behind I.C. § 12-117, the denial of the Contractors' motion tacitly 
excused DPW's spurious cross-claim, and read I.C. §12-117 out of existence. 
The District Court improperly limited its analysis on the Contractors' joint 
motion to an I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(8) determination of prevailing party status. 
However, that is not an acceptable way for an Idaho court to harmonize a court 
rule and statute, because the application of a court rule cannot read a statute out 
of existence. This Court has long held that "it is not within the proper province of 
any court to legislate a rule or statute out of existence by judicial construction." 
Nielson v. Bd. of Com'rs of Bonneville Cty., 40 Idaho 481,234 P. 686,687 (1925) 
(Lee, C.J., concurring). 
"The primary function of the court in construing a statute is to determine 
legislative intent and give effect thereto." George W Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537,540,797 P.2d 1385,1338 (1990), citing inter alia, 
Carpenter v. Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho 575, 691 P.2d 1247 (1983). In 
interpreting a statute, this Court has held many times that it "must give every 
word, clause and sentence effect, if possible." See, e.g., Webb v. Webb, 143 
Idaho 521, 525, 148 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2006), citing, In re Permit No. 36-7200, 
121 Idaho 819, 822, 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992). In order to give proper effect to 
I.C. §12-117, its mandatory nature must be applied to the District Court's findings 
in determining DPW's cross-claim to be "barred." 
- 28-
Idaho courts must prioritize any perceived conflict between a court rule 
and statute in favor of the statute: 
... court rules or decisions may coexist with statutes so long as they 
do not conflict. When there is a conflict, the judiciary defers to the 
legislature unless the issue is governed by the state or federal 
constitution. 
State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 785-86, 735 P.2d 1089, 1096-97 (1987). Since 
there is no implication of a constitutional issue here, it was error for the District 
Court to halt its analysis at an I.R.C.P. 54(b) determination that both parties 
partly prevailed. And, since the District Court determined both that DPW's cross-
claim was brought without reasonable basis (it was "barred;" and its pursuit could 
not be reconciled with "any possible finding of a lack of prejudice"), and that the 
Contractors were "prevailing in part," the District Court's failure to give the full 
meaning to the mandatory provisions of I.C. §12-117 was error. 
3. DPW's Misinterpretation of its Contract with S/EZ is the 
Further Evidence that DPW Acted Without "Reasonable 
Basis." 
DPW's misinterpretations of the SE/Z contract, offered to convince the 
District Court not to dismiss the cross-claim, are the kinds of acts by a state 
agency that this Court has repeatedly held warrants an award of attorney's fees 
and expenses under I.C. §12-117. 
This Court has repeatedly held that an action based on an agency's 
misinterpretation of a "clear and unambiguous" statute or administrative rule 
properly gives rise to an award of attorney's fees and costs under I.C. §12-117. 
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In In re Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 108 P.3d 324 (2005), this Court affirmed a 
magistrate's decision (and the District Court's subsequent affirmation) of an 
award of attorney's fees and expenses under I.C. §12-117 for the wrongful 
pursuit of the repayment of medical benefits. In Elliott, the Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare based its action against the claimant on an "erroneous 
interpretation" of an "unambiguous statute." Id. at 184, 331. 
Similarly, this Court has held that misinterpretations by municipalities and 
other state agencies are proper bases for an I.C. § 12-117 award to wronged 
persons. See, e.g., Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 175 
P.3d 776 (2007) (fees awarded based on a determination that a municipality 
abused its discretion in interpreting an ordinance); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 
supra (fees awarded for municipality's failure to have acted with reasonable basis 
in interpreting its conditional use permit process); and Gardiner v. Boundary 
County Bd. of Commissioners, 148 Idaho 764, 229 P.3d 369, 374 (2010) (fees 
awarded due to County Board of Commissioners' acts contrary to an 
unambiguous state statute and local ordinance). 
The holding in Gardiner, supra, is particularly informative. In affirming an 
. attorney's fees award under I.C. §12-117 based on the Boundary County Board 
of Commissioners' misinterpretation of a local zoning ordinance, this Court held: 
This Court affirms the award of attorney fees by the district court. 
This case is similar to Lane Ranch P'Ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 
Idaho 87, 88-91, 175 P.3d 776-778-80 (2007) and Fischer [v. City 
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of KetchumJ 141 Idaho at 356, 109 P.3d at 1098, because in both 
cases an agency ignored the plain and unambiguous language of a 
statute or ordinance, which led to the award of attorney fees. 
Likewise, the grant of attorney fees to the Gardiners is affirmed 
because the Board acted contrary to an unambiguous state statute 
and a local ordinance. 
148 Idaho at 769, 229 P.3d at 374. Here, the Dis~rict Court repeatedly 
determined the DPW-S/EZ contract to be "clear and unambiguous." See, e.g., R. 
Vol. II, p 283; R. Vol. IV, p. 628 and p. 740. In manner similar to the way the 
agencies misinterpreted statutes and ordinances in Gardiner, Lane Ranch P'ship 
and Fischer, here DPW repeatedly misinterpreted the "plain and unambiguous" 
language of the Main Contract to the District Court. Falsely asserting either that 
it had complied with the Main Contract, or that was somehow not required to, 
DPW misrepresented the plain meaning of a contract it drafted, and which it 
admitted not following. And, like the persons wronged in Gardiner, Lane Ranch 
P'ship and Fischer, the Contractors are required to be compensated by I.C. §12-
117, even if they only partially prevailed by defeating the cross claim in the action 
below. 
4. The District Court's Finding that the Contractors "Prevailed in 
Part" Required The Court to Make an Award to the Contractors 
Under I.C. §12-117(2). 
This Court's free review of the District Court's decision should result in a 
finding that even if the Contractors prevailing only "in part" below, they are still 
entitled to an award of costs and fees. 
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Since I.C. §12-117 is "clear, unambiguous and mandatory," all of its 
sections and provisions are as well. The District Court's finding that the 
Contractors prevailed in part unquestionably implicates the mandatory language 
of I.C. §12-117(2), which provides, in pertinent part: 
If a party ... prevails on a portion of the case, and the ... court ... finds 
that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law with respect to that portion of the case, it shall award the 
partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees 
and other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the 
case on which it prevailed ... 
Here the District Court made specific findings that: a) DPW's cross-claim 
could not have been brought due to its failures to have adhered to contractual 
prerequisites, and therefore was void ab initio; and b) the Contractors were 
partially prevailing due to their having defeated DPW's cross-claim. With the 
plain language of I.C. §12-117(2) mandating an award under such 
circumstances, the District Court erred when it failed to award the Contractors 
their attorney's fees expenses. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT FINDING THE 
CONTRACTORS TO HAVE BEEN PREVAILING OVERALL. 
"In a multiple-claim action, the trial court is vested with discretion to 
determine which party prevailed overall, and may apportion costs and fees, 
taking into account the disposition of all claims, counterclaims or other multiple 
issues." Holmes v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 784,874 P.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1994) citing, 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(8); Int'l Engineering Co., Inc. v. Daum Indus., Inc., 102 Idaho 
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363, 366-67, 630 P.2d 155 (1981); Jones v. Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886, 889-90, 
736 P.2d 1340 (Ct. App. 1987). 
"In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims 
and counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed 
'in the action.' That is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined 
from an overall view, not a claim-by-c1aim analysis." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 
148 Idaho 536,538,224 P.3d 1125,1127 (2010), quoting Eighteen Mile Ranch, 
L.L.C. v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130 
(2005). 
Here, the Contractors were unquestionably the overall prevailing parties, 
and the District Court abused its discretion by not so finding. The Contractors 
prevailed due to: a) the amount ultimately agreed to be paid to the Contractors by 
the State; b) the number of claims below on which the Contractors prevailed; and 
c) the results obtained below in comparison with the value of the damages 
asserted in the parties' various claims (most notably by DPW's cross-claim). 
1. SE/Z and Hobson Achieved a Positive Recovery from the 
State. 
"In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to 
costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or 
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(8). This Court has held that offers of settlement, including 
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offers of judgment, should be considered in determining the final judgment or 
result of the action in relation to the relief sought. See, e.g., Zenner v. Holcomb, 
147 Idaho 444, 210 P.3d 552 (2009) , citing, Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 
313, 17 P.3d 247 (2000) . 
DPW agreed to pay the Contractors $225,000 to settle the causes of 
action that remained for trial. Therefore, pursuant to Zenner, the District Court 
should have considered that the Contractors' action against DPW resulted in a 
positive monetary result for them , while DPW recovered nothing from its several 
causes of action. 
2. The Contractors Prevailed on Most of Their Affirmative Causes 
of Action, While DPW Prevailed on None of its Affirmative 
Causes of Action. 
The consolidated matter below included 22 causes of action asserted by 
the parties, including three causes of action brought by DPW against its 
Architect, which were dismissed with prejudice on Hobson's Motion in Limine. 
See, R. Vol. V, pp. 935-37. 
At the time of the parties' settlement in April 2010, only four causes of 
action remained for trial , all of which involved the Contractors' affirmative claims. 
Given that the State settled those remaining causes of action for a cash payment 
to the Contractors, of the combined 19 causes of action collectively brought by 
DPW, SE/Z and Hobson, the Contractors prevailed on 14. In their Joint Motion 
on Prevailing Party and for Award of Costs and Fees, the Contractors illustrated 
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these results for the District Court in a table. See, R. Vol. V, pp. 936-37. 
Ultimately, the Contractors prevailed on ten of the 15 causes of action on which 
pre-trial summary determinations were made by the District Court, and were paid 
by DPW to settle four of the remaining five. However, the District Court, 
apparently eschewing the authority of cases like Holmes and Zenner, supra, 
made no meaningful analysis of how or by how much the Contractors prevailed 
below, and simply determined that some success by DPW against the 
Contractors warranted a finding that both parties "partly prevailed," and justified a 
denial of attorney's fees and expenses to the Contractors. 
3. The Contractors' Defeat of the DPW's Cross-Claim 
Demonstrates Them to have been Prevailing Below. 
When determining prevailing party status, Idaho courts must consider not 
only what affirmative amounts were recovered, but also what opposing claims 
were defeated. In Eighteen Mile Ranch, supra, this Court explained how a 
District Court should properly apply the "overall view" analysis, and why the 
District Court in that matter erred-much as the court below did in this matter--by 
denying the defendant its requested fees: 
Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord Excavating 
was a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the district court focused 
too much attention on the Company's less than tremendous 
success on its counterclaim and seemingly ignored the fact that the 
Company avoided all liability as a defendant. The district court 
improperly undervalued the Company's successful defense. 
Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. 
141 Idaho at 719. 
- 35-
The Contractors prevailed on the vast majority of all claims below, and 
also defeated what was by far the largest claim in the entire action , DPW's cross-
claim. As the Contractors demonstrated in their Joint Motion, including its 
spurious claims for breach of contract, liquidated damages and interest, DPW's 
cross-claim was likely to have exceeded $4 million at trial. See, R. Vol. V, p. 
938. 
With such huge potential liability dwarfing the balance of the claims in the 
action below, the District Court should have considered as part of its analysis that 
the Contractors significantly prevailed both in the number of claims determined 
below, and importantly, by avoiding the huge potential liability of DPW's cross-
claim . By failing to use the "overall standpoint" analysis endorsed by this Court in 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, and by not properly considering the Contractors' defeat of 
the DPW cross-claim, the District Court abused its discretion . Proper analyses of 
the parties' claims below militated for the Contractors to be determined the 
prevailing parties, which when coupled with the District Court's findings regarding 
the cross-claim, should have further resulted in an award of attorney's fees and 
expenses to the Contractors under I.C. §12-117(1). 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MAKING AN AWARD OF 
EXPENSES TO THE INDIVIUAL DEFENDANTS, WHO WERE 
DEFENDED BY DPW. 
The District Court also erred by awarding costs to the individual 
Defendants below, who were defended by DPW in the action. In making that 
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award, the District Court agam ignored the Eighteen Mile Ranch authority 
regarding determining the prevailing party(ies) from an "overall" perspective. 
Rather, the District Court impermissibly carved the consolidated action against 
the individual Defendants out of the overall action, in order to make its award of 
costs to them. 
In seeking an award for the individual defendants, DPW relied on Daisy 
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. PaintbalJ Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 999 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 
2000)4, which is not an analog to the facts of this action. Daisy involved claims 
brought by a single plaintiff against a single defendant, and did not involve the 
multiple and competing causes of action and multiple parties that populated this 
action below. Unlike what Eighteen Mile Ranch and like authority required the 
District Court to do here with regard to determining the prevailing party(ies) from 
an "overall" perspective, the Daisy trial court was not under such requirement. 
Rather, the Daisy trial undertook a "most favorable outcome" analysis, 
applicable only to matters in which competing single party claims are at issue. In 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, this Court drew the distinctions between the two 
approaches, even pointing out that in Daisy, the requesting individual defendants 
had been represented by the same counsel, and therefore some overlapping of 
counsel's services and scales of economy were realized, which militated against 
4 Daisy was abrogated on other grounds by 8ECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-8 Engineers Inc., 149 
Idaho 294,233 P.3d 1216 (2010), rehearing denied. 
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an individual award to some defendants in a multi-cause action in which no 
"overall view" was made. See, 141 Idaho at 719-20, fn .2. 
DPW chose to consolidate the individual defendants into an action in 
which multiple causes of action between the parties already existed. DPW then 
defended the individuals, for whom no evidence of incurring actual expense was 
provided the District Court. Having failed to take all the aspects of an award to 
the individual defendants into account, the District Court erred by not making a 
proper "overall view" analysis, which should have militated to no award of costs 
being made to the individual defendants. 
E. THE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE DETERMINED TO HAVE 
PREVAILED ON APPEAL, AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE AWARDED 
THIER COSTS ON APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 40, AND THEIR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL UNDER I.C. § 12-117. 
Upon a determination by this Court that the Contractors have prevailed on 
this appeal , Hobson respectfully requests that the Court award them their costs 
and attorney's fees on appeal. 
I.A.R. 40(a) provides: 
Costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party 
unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court. 
Therefore, should the Court determine that the Contractors have prevailed on 
their appeal , Hobson should be entitled to an award of those costs incurred, as 
those costs are allowed by I.A.R. 40. 
I. A. R. 41 (a) provides: 
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Any party seeking attorney fees on appeal must assert such a claim 
as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by 
such party as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5); provided, 
however, the Supreme Court may permit a later claim for attorney 
fees under such conditions as it deems appropriate. 
Hobson has complied with I. A. R. 41 by making the request for attorney's fees in 
its Open i ng Brief. 
Attorney's fees and expenses under I.C. §12-117 are awardable to a party 
prevailing on appeal, where the appeal involves action by a public agency 
"without a reasonable basis in fact or law." See, e.g., Brown v. City of Pocatello, 
148 Idaho 802,811,229 P.3d 1164, 1174 (2010). In a number of cases, Idaho 
appellate courts have awarded costs and fees under I.C. §12-117 when affirming 
a trial court's determination that the action of the agency violated that statute. 
See, e.g., Union Pacific Land Resources Corp. v. Shoshone County Assessor, 
140 Idaho 528, 535, 96 P.3d 629, 636 (2004). 
The District Court failed to make any analysis of entitlement under I.C. 
§12-117, despite its findings that DPW's cross-claim was "barred," and therefore 
was without efficacy ab initio. On "free review" here, this Court can and should 
find that the wholesale lack of efficacy in DPW's cross-claim warranted a further 
finding by the District Court-whether the Contractors are determined to have 
prevailed overall or merely in part on DPW's cross claim-that an award to the 
Contractors under I.C. §12-117 was proper. Such finding under authority like 
Brown, supra, would then implicate a further award of attorney's fees and 
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expenses on appeal under I.C. § 12-117 and I.A.R. 41. Hobson asserts the 
Contractors are so entitled here, and renews its request for such award. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
I.C. §12-117 was enacted specifically to protect "persons" like the 
Contractors from unfair and capricious acts of governmental agencies. Here, 
however, the District Court erred when it failed to give meaning to that statute 
based on its findings regarding the lack of efficacy of DPW's cross-claim. 
The District Court's errors allowed DPW to bring and prosecute for more 
than four years a wholly spurious cross-claim, requiring the Contractors to 
expend hundreds of thousands of dollars in preparing to defend against it. And, 
even though the District Court found that the Contractors "prevailed in part" in the 
overall action below by defeating the cross-claim shortly before the second trial, 
the court compounded its previous errors by failing to give meaning to the 
mandatory language of §12-117, and in particular, §12-117(2), which required 
the District Court to sanction DPW and compensate the Contractors for DPW's 
wrongful cross-claim. 
On free review, this Court can and should rectify the wrongs visited on the 
Contractors by DPW, and give the requisite meaning to I.C. §12-117. Hobson 
respectfully requests that the Court make findings, alternately that, owing in large 
part to the lack of efficacy in DPW's cross-claim: a) the District Court failed to 
properly determine the Contractors to have been the overall prevailing parties 
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below, and were therefore improperly denied the Contractors an award of 
attorney's fees and expenses under I.C. §12-117(1); or b) that even if the 
Contractors prevailed only in part as to DPW's cross-claim, under the District 
Court they were stil/ entitled to a mandatory award of attorney's fees and 
expenses under I.C. §12-117(2). 
Further, Hobson also requests that the Court a) reverse the District 
Court's award of costs to the individual defendants; and b) grant its fees and 
expenses on this appeal under §12-117(2). 
DATED this 20th day of July, 2011. 
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